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515 
SO MUCH TO REWRITE, SO LITTLE 
TIME . . . . 
Sanford Levinson* 
Like other participants in this symposium, I’ve been 
charged with answering the following question: “If you were 
rewriting the U.S. Constitution, what would it say?” I am faced 
with a dilemma: I have written a book, Our Undemocratic 
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We 
the People Can Correct It),1 outlining my many criticisms of the 
Constitution, and nothing in the now-almost-five years since 
original publication has diminished my belief that the 
Constitution imposes on us a dangerously dysfunctional political 
order that presents a clear and present danger to our collective 
future. If anything, as my language may suggest to some readers, 
my loss of “faith” in the Constitution has become ever stronger, 
and I, therefore, have become something of a crank on the point. 
I have also become somewhat crankish regarding what our 
students learn from us about constitutions in the United States. I 
think we in the legal academy (and I use the personal pronoun 
advisedly) generally do a dreadful job of teaching American 
constitutionalism to our students because we have reduced that 
subject almost exclusively to a set of issues that are (or have 
been) litigated before the United States Supreme Court. 
Moreover, we systematically ignore the fact that all Americans, 
other than those living in the District of Columbia, live under 
two constitutions, not only the national constitution.2 State 
constitutions, to put it mildly, have their own interest for anyone 
interested in comparative constitutionalism, ranging from 
interestingly different ways of organizing basic institutions—e.g., 
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 1. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 2. See Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State 
Constitutions for our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 575 (2011). 
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the predominance of decidedly non-unitary executives in the 
states or elected judiciaries—to the presence of guarantees of 
“positive rights.”3 Most important, in many ways, is the rejection 
in almost all the states of the Founders’ antipathy to even a hint 
of direct democracy. 
All of those issues should be brought to our students’ 
attention in ways that I fear is not now the case. I have argued 
elsewhere that there is no real justification for the common 
practice in American law schools of requiring students to take 
constitutional law unless it is to prepare them to be better 
citizens and potential civic leaders. It is quite unlikely that their 
legal practices will ever involve constitutional law (save for those 
students who go into the practice of criminal law and therefore 
must know the constitutional aspects of criminal procedure, a 
topic that is almost universally not covered in the required 
courses).4 As citizens—and, even more, as potential leaders—our 
students should be informed that the Constitution is, for better, 
and I think, very much for worse, far more than what is 
commonly presented in their law school courses. 
When talking in October 2010 with a group of Chinese 
students visiting Harvard, I somewhat surprised them by 
suggesting that the main thing that foreign students (and 
constitutional drafters) can learn from the United States is what 
not to do. What might be genuinely attractive about the 
Constitution, including its protection of certain rights, can be 
found, in the modern world, in almost all constitutions, not to 
mention the fact that most modern constitutions also include 
guarantees of positive rights that are left unmentioned in the 
national constitution (though not, as already noted, in American 
state constitutions). Indeed, almost no modern country has 
looked to the United States for inspiration; for altogether good 
reason, constitution drafters abroad are far more likely to look 
at France, Germany, Canada, Spain, and, since 1996, South 
Africa. There have, to be sure, been some desirable amendments 
to the Constitution since 1788, but, frankly, none of them comes 
close to curing the basic structural failures of the original 
document, what I have come to call the “hard-wired” features 
that most professors never bother discussing with their students 
because they are never subject to litigation. These include, but 
 
 3. See Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”: A View from 
American States, 57 KAN. L. REV. 791 (2011). 
 4. Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the United States Constitution: 
Competing Narratives of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L.J. 1337 (2009). 
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are not limited to, bicameralism—including the particularity that 
each house has a death-dealing veto over legislation passed in 
the other house; the presidential veto that, because of its 
onerous requirements for override, turns us functionally into a 
tricameral political system; the fixed presidential term; and an 
amendment procedure that establishes the U.S. Constitution as 
the hardest-to-amend in the entire world (in marked contrast, I 
should note, to almost all American state constitutions).5 These 
structures have become the unchallengeable—because so 
thoughtlessly accepted—ground against which we attempt to 
paint our political futures. 
As I wrote in my book, Madisonian “veneration” has 
triumphed with a vengeance,6 so much so that we reject the 
much wiser Madisonian imperative, set out most eloquently in 
Federalist 14,7 to learn from the lessons of experience or, if one 
prefers Hamilton, to accept the duty, as he set out in the very 
first Federalist, to engage in “reflection and choice” when 
deciding how we want to organize our political lives.8 Instead, we 
are living in an ultra-Burkean society that often seems to be 
organized around a truly remarkable kind of ancestor worship—
extending well beyond the persons of the ancestors to the 
handiwork they created—that would amaze any anthropologists 
stumbling upon it in what used to be called a “primitive” society. 
Both masses—think only of the Tea Party—and elites seem to 
unite around the notion that we are lucky to have the 
Constitution we do, even if, needless to say, there is often bitter 
conflict about exactly what it means. My own emphasis on the 
“hard-wired” Constitution, incidentally, allows me to forego 
almost all “interpretive” disputes, since there is no serious 
argument about the “meaning” of most of these particular 
provisions, even if, as I want to suggest, there should be far more 
concern than is common expressed about their wisdom. 
 
 5. See Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 237, 261 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (noting that at the time, the United 
States came in second in degree of difficulty to the Yugoslav Constitution, which, of 
course, is no longer operative).  
 6. LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 16–19. See also Sanford Levinson, “Veneration” and 
Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional 
Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 2443 (1990). 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
home/histdox/fedpapers.html.  
 8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.  
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The Chinese students asked me if there is any feature of the 
original Constitution that I admire, and I quickly answered “the 
Preamble,” which does indeed set out a thoroughly admirable 
set of ends to which we should be devoted as a polity. The 
problem is that what comes after the Preamble has made it 
remarkably difficult to actually attain those ends. I am 
exempting from my critique “assignments of power,” as in 
Article 1, Section 8, or “limitations on power,” as in Article I, 
Sections 9 or 10, or, of course, the Bill of Rights. As Madison 
suggested, these are by and large “parchment barriers”9 that 
explain relatively little about the ensuing history of American 
constitutional development. This may well be true as well of the 
“Reconstruction Amendments,” which utterly failed for almost a 
full century to bring about the “regime change” that was so 
necessary (and altogether proper) following the catastrophe in 
which 600,000 Americans died for what Lincoln (with somewhat 
limited accuracy) called a “new birth of freedom.” Instead, the 
“slavery bonus” of the 3/5 compromise in the 1787 Constitution 
was succeeded by an even more ample “segregation bonus” in 
which the former slaves now counted as full human beings for 
purposes of representation, but rarely, whatever the 15th 
Amendment might suggest to the contrary, were allowed to vote. 
The Constitution is surely better with those Amendments than 
without, but no one should overestimate their empirical 
importance in actually explaining the contours of American 
history. One can scarcely describe as a “parchment barrier,” 
however, Article I, Section 3, which establishes the Senate and 
its absolutely egregious assignment of equal voting power to 
each state. It has had immeasurably more impact on our polity 
than, say, the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As a result of returning to undergraduate teaching and 
preparing lectures for undergraduate courses at the University of 
Texas and Harvard, I am currently writing a book that will 
constitute a very extensive response to Professor Hasday’s 
question. Even then, however, I will refrain from offering a full 
answer inasmuch as I continue very strongly to believe that a 
new constitutional convention is badly needed, and that, 
inevitably, what would come out of such a convention would 
reflect both changes of mind on the part of participants after 
deliberative discussion as well as necessary compromises 
 
 9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.  
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resulting from hard bargaining among conflicting groups.10 The 
one thing I am absolutely confident of is that no one will appoint 
me to be the sole rewriter of our very defective Constitution. 
So the question for me is to have a rough rank order of 
deficiencies, which, almost by definition, also establishes 
potential items for compromise. Thus, for example, I strongly 
believe that life tenure for Supreme Court justices is an idea 
whose time has long gone.11 There are several rationales, all of 
them favoring limits: a) the simple need for new blood and new 
ideas; b) the unfortunate fact that many justices over our history, 
including, most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist, have simply 
been unable to exercise self-discipline and to retire when faced 
with debilitating illness at an old age; or c) the unseemly 
spectacle of justices “hanging on” until a president is elected 
from their own party who can therefore name a politically 
congruent successor. I would therefore certainly rewrite the 
Constitution to get rid of life tenure and substitute in its stead 
single 18-year terms, with no possibility of reappointment. 
Because of the contingency that we have a nine-person supreme 
court, such a system would create vacancies every two years and 
make it impossible for even a two-term president to name a 
majority of its membership. A political party would have to be 
successful in three consecutive presidential elections (as well, of 
course, as control the Senate) in order to capture the Court. But 
I do not, by any means, believe that this is the worst feature of 
our Constitution; indeed, I’d be a far happier person if I thought 
that were the case. So if proponents of life tenure, however 
mistaken, were to offer a deal by which I would drop my 
opposition to continuing that practice in return for their 
agreeing, say, to adopt new principles of representation in the 
Senate or to eliminate the electoral college, I’d accept the deal in 
a nano-second. 
So let me suggest, very briefly, what I currently believe are 
some of the most awful features of a generally defective 
Constitution very much in need of rewriting. I do not mean to 
rank order them; indeed, on different days, and different 
political contexts, I would rank them differently. I am confident, 
though, that any serious discussion of the Constitution and its 
potential rewriting would have to grapple (at least) with these: 
 
 10. See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821 
(2011). 
 11. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES (Paul Carrington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2006). 
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1. Equal representation in the Senate. Even those who 
generally like the Senate are hard pressed to offer any 
cogent defense for the principle, given that it is in the 
original Constitution only because Madison and others 
who were correctly revolted by the idea decided to 
submit to the extortionate demands of Delaware and 
other small states rather than risk the collapse of the 
constitution-drafting enterprise itself. The “principle” of 
equal representation has no more respectable a pedigree 
than do the various compromises with slave interests. All 
were arguably “necessary” (I dare not say “proper”) in 
order to achieve the over-riding aim of achieving 
national unity and preventing the collapse of the United 
States into three separate countries along the Atlantic 
coast. Thus, Madison refers in Federalist 62 to the 
principle of equal representation as a “lesser evil” and 
offers nothing further by way of a defense. Successor 
generations are in no way required to feel even a scintilla 
of obligation to adhere to such compromises once the 
objective situation makes that no longer “necessary.” 
Were Delaware and other small states to threaten, 
during the next constitutional convention, to secede, let 
them. Why exactly should we care, unlike the situation in 
1787, when the loss of Delaware and other small states 
would have been catastrophic? The fact is, of course, that 
Delaware and other similar states—Alaska may be an 
exception—could not offer a credible threat to secede. If 
truth be known, they would be lucky to preserve their 
statehood at all. 
2. But one shouldn’t stop with making the allocation of 
power in the Senate more proportional. The fact is that 
there is no good reason for the Senate to be organized 
along state geographical lines at all. That’s what the 
House of Representatives is for. One of the truly 
dreadful features of the American system of government 
is that no one other than Presidents (and, because of the 
electoral college, this is only partially true even of them), 
has any genuine incentive to think in terms of what 
Madison and others imbued with the ideology of civic 
republicanism referred to as the “common interest” or 
“national good.” Both Houses of Congress are full of 
dedicated anti-cosmopolitans who organize their political 
lives around pandering to their extremely limited 
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constituencies. (See, for example, former South Dakota 
Sen. Tom Daschle’s faithful service to Citicorp, which 
brilliantly relocated its Citicard operations to that state 
and therefore in effect bought a senator as well as 
cheaper labor. It was Daschle who helped shepherd 
through the Senate the truly awful bankruptcy bill that is 
causing grief to many Americans today.) I have no 
objection to one House being organized on such a 
principle, even if Madison might rightly have viewed this 
as a capitulation to a politics of “faction,” but there is no 
reason for doing that with both. 
  The Senate, if it survives—and I do believe that the 
United States is much too large to function with only one 
legislative body and the inevitable distortions that a 
single house brings—should be composed of members 
elected from entirely different constituencies. There 
could, for example, be nationwide elections based on 
proportional representation by party, which would assure 
that dispersed groups (who, ironically, may be worse off 
than “discrete and insular minorities” who congregate in 
particular areas) might actually be able to gain 
representation that an exclusively geographical principle 
of selection now makes near impossible. This could easily 
generate several new parties, which itself would be a 
benefit. There is no reason to believe that the two-party 
duopoly, itself partly a creation of the particular 
structures created by the Constitution, has served the 
country particularly well. Many countries around the 
world function quite well with multi-party systems. To be 
sure, this would, by definition, increase the probability 
that an occasional “extreme” party could in fact be 
represented, but this would, I believe, be a relatively 
cheap price to pay in return for the added representation 
of many groups who are marginalized by the vagaries of 
an exclusively geographically-oriented system of 
representation. Australia, for example, organizes its 
Senate on the same principle of equal representation as 
ours, but the twelve state senators are elected on the 
basis of proportional representation, which, as one would 
predict, produces greater diversity in the Australian 
senate than the single-member district Australian House. 
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As Virginia professor Larry Sabato has suggested,12 one 
might also make ex officio senators of all former 
presidents and vice-presidents, retired members of the 
Supreme Court, former heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
former heads of the Federal Reserve, and the like, in 
order to provide important perspectives that are likely to 
be lacking. 
3. My rewritten Constitution might well dispense with the 
President in favor of a parliamentary system, though I 
confess that I do not have settled views on this. One of 
the reasons I support a convention is that I would very 
much want to hear what people have to say, since there 
are obvious strengths and weaknesses in both 
presidential and parliamentary systems. Moreover, one 
must be careful to recognize that there are in fact 
varieties of each system, so that it is a fundamental error 
to essentialize either of them. The character of a given 
presidential system may depend importantly on the 
extent to which the chief executive is, for example, able 
to appoint all members of the executive branch (unlike, 
say, forty-eight of the fifty governors in the United 
States, who participate in decidedly non-unitary 
executive branches);13 whether the president has a veto 
power that can be relatively easily overridden by the 
legislature; the particular term of office enjoyed by the 
chief executive; or, whatever the length of the term, 
whether the President is allowed to run for repeated re-
election. I am confident, though, that any acceptable 
presidential system within the United States must have a 
procedure for a solemn vote of “no confidence,” by, say, 
2/3 of Congress meeting together as a single body, 
presumably reflecting the basic loss of faith in the 
President’s judgment and capacity for minimally wise 
decisions. (I would not rule out adoption of a direct-
democracy “recall” system.) In the modern world, it is 
dreadfully fallacious to believe that we can blithely put 
up with an incompetent president for a substantial 
amount of time until the next election. It is not only that 
our enemies are always looking for weaknesses; it is also 
that great structural forces, whether one thinks of the 
 
 12. See LARRY SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: 23 PROPOSALS TO 
REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY (2007). 
 13. See Jacob Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301 (2010). 
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globalized economy, natural disasters, or public health 
emergencies, may call for highly freighted decisions, and, 
to put it mildly, the public is entitled to have in office 
someone in whom they (or at least 1/3+1) feel a requisite 
degree of confidence. 
4. If we retained a presidential system, my rewritten 
constitution would have a very different inauguration 
day, very much closer to the election itself. It is vitally 
important that we have, as much as possible, a 
government that combines legal authority with political 
legitimacy. Our hiatus between election and inauguration 
guarantees that with some frequency we lack this most 
elemental political good. Of course, any significant 
moving up of inauguration day would ultimately require 
getting rid of the electoral college, but that’s a feature, 
not a bug.  
  Even if we retrain the dreadful electoral college, 
though, surely we would want to change the consequence 
of an electoral college deadlock (i.e., the failure of a 
candidate to gain a majority of electoral votes), which is 
to have the House of Representatives make the choice 
from the top three candidates on a one state/one vote 
basis. In debating the electoral college over the years, I 
have not yet found anyone who is willing to defend this 
aspect of the “electoral college system.”14 Usually the 
response is something to the effect that “it hasn’t 
happened since 1824” and, therefore, won’t happen 
again. To put it mildly, this is an unconvincing argument, 
not least because the shifts of a relatively small number 
of votes in both 1948 and 1968, when Strom Thurmond 
and George Wallace, respectively, won 39 and 47 
electoral votes, might well have required the House to 
choose between Truman and Dewey or Nixon and 
Humphrey (since it is inconceivable that they would have 
chosen Thurmond or Wallace). Surely the events of the 
past several years, whether one thinks of force-five 
hurricanes hitting major American cities or the near-
collapse of the world economic order, should make us 
 
 14. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, John McGinnis & Dan Lowenstein, Debate, Should 
we Dispense with the Electoral College?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 10 (2007), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=8 (showing that neither Professor 
McGinnis nor Professor Lowenstein was willing to defend the “electoral college system” 
in its totality). 
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skeptical of “since the odds are low, we shouldn’t worry 
at all” forms of argument. 
5. My rewritten Constitution would eliminate what George 
Mason on September 15, 1787, apparently described to 
his colleagues in Philadelphia as “that unnecessary (and 
dangerous) officer the Vice-President.”15 If one believes 
that it is highly desirable to have a designated “president-
in-waiting,” then, at the very least, the selection of the 
vice-president should be postponed until the 
inauguration of the new president, at which time he or 
she would nominate someone, under the procedures set 
out in the 25th Amendment, to fill that office upon the 
confirmation by both houses of Congress. This would 
assure, presumably, at least minimally competent and 
experienced vice-presidents in whom the country would 
have confidence to take the helm at what would 
necessarily be a time of anxiety, in contrast to, say, Spiro 
Agnew, Dan Quayle, Sarah Palin, or, for that matter, 
Geraldine Ferraro or John Edwards. Those members of 
Congress who debated the all-too-rarely-studied Twelfth 
Amendment recognized that changing the basic way that 
we elected the President and Vice-President—i.e., to 
create two “separate tracks” that involved a de facto 
recognition of the creation of a party system with a 
primary candidate running for the presidency and a 
“running mate” who would get the number two office—
would create a great incentive for the presidential 
candidate to choose a running mate not on the basis of 
who would be best for the country, but, rather, who 
might help provide key votes to win the election itself. 
Such skeptics were, of course, entirely correct. Perhaps 
we should count ourselves lucky in the number of 
competent vice presidents we have had, but there is no 
reason to rely on such luck (anymore than we should rely 
on the electoral college always producing a majority 
winner). I would also allow for votes of no confidence in 
congressionally-confirmed vice-presidents. Just consider 
Dick Cheney, after all, who on paper represented an 
altogether plausible choice by George W. Bush in 2000. 
Whatever reasons there might be to reject a “no-
 
 15. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 639 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile 
=show.hp%3Ftitle=1786&layout=html#chapter_96199.  
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confidence” vote in the President scarcely seem 
applicable to the Vice-President, who, notoriously, has 
no constitutionally assigned responsibilities other than to 
serve as President of the Senate. 
6. My rewritten Constitution would address the subject of 
“emergency powers” in a way that is simply lacking in 
the current document. Almost every other contemporary 
constitution provides a better model than does our own. 
We might study with special care, for example, the South 
African Constitution. In any event, we should realize that 
suspension of habeas corpus, however relevant to 
invasions or insurrections, is really likely to be quite 
beside the point with regard to economic emergencies, 
natural disasters, or pandemics.16 
7. Finally, I would rewrite the Constitution to allow a 
significantly easier amendment process. I would also 
spell out some of the procedures for a new convention, 
inasmuch as the Framers were almost criminally 
negligent in this regard. I would, for example, select 
delegates to the convention by a national lottery among 
the voting-eligible citizenry, minimally stratified to make 
sure of regional diversity. They would be paid, for up to 
two years, the salaries received by senators, with 
guaranteed sufficient funding to hold hearings literally all 
over the world, as well as all over the United States, of 
course, on the issues they would necessarily confront. 
One consequence of the near-draconian Article V, which 
makes it functionally impossible to amend the 
Constitution with regard to any half-way controversial 
issue (especially if it negatively affects even thirteen of 
the fifty states), is that it serves to make symposia like 
this appear to most people like a pointless academic 
exercise rather than a serious discussion about truly 
possible changes. 
These by no means conclude my possible list of potential 
changes in our Constitution. Would we really wish to retain the 
bar on naturalized citizens from becoming President, or require 
newly naturalized citizens to wait seven and nine years, 
respectively, before being eligible to serve in the House or the 
 
 16. See generally, Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010). 
 
!!!LEVINSON-273-SOMUCHTOREWRITE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:29 PM 
526 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:515 
 
Senate? Do we necessarily want to continue the bar on members 
of Congress serving in the Executive Branch, or to continue to 
require every member of the House of Representatives to face a 
re-election campaign that increasingly begins almost literally 
within a year or so of taking the oath of office? (Perhaps we 
could have four-year staggered terms, with half of the House 
facing re-election in each election cycle.) The topics of discussion 
are almost literally endless. 
But I take it that I have given an adequate taste of the kinds 
of inquiries that I believe are vitally important for law professors 
to initiate not only among themselves—i.e., the readers of 
Constitutional Commentary—but also, and more importantly, 
among their students. In any event, I am deeply grateful to 
Professor Hasday and the editors of Constitutional Commentary 
for organizing this symposium, which I, at least, view as an act of 
high citizenship and not merely a form of academic entertain-
ment. 
 
